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BOOK REVIEWS
A BIT OF A MAVERICK
Pillsbury, Michael� The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower� New York: Henry Holt, 2015� 319pp� $30 
The Hundred-Year Marathon is the 
culmination of a lifetime’s work on 
Chinese security policy by Dr� Michael 
Pillsbury (1945–), an independent 
China analyst based in Washington, 
D�C� The book is popular, not academic� 
That said, it is by and large accurate 
and must be read and digested� 
At the outset, though, two issues must be 
raised� One is the title� The other is the 
author� The title suggests, with no evi-
dence, that somehow a secret Masonic 
cabal has existed in China for a century, 
having as its purpose the overthrow 
of the United States as leading world 
power� Taken literally that would mean 
planning got under way in 1915, under 
President Yuan Shikai, continued during 
Chiang Kai-shek’s watch, and then on 
through Mao Zedong and beyond—
which, bluntly put, is not history at all, 
but classic tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory� 
China’s changing international behavior 
over the last century is indeed difficult 
to explain, but it is most certainly not 
the product of some arcane “Protocols 
for the Replacement of America�” 
As for Pillsbury, he is well-trained, hard-
working, and independently wealthy� 
He is the author of original and defini-
tive books about the People’s Liberation 
Army� He is also a bit of a maverick: a 
one-man show, rarely part of a team� 
Long a proponent of pro-China policies, 
including sale of weapons to Beijing in 
the 1980s and 1990s, he has, as he tells 
it, changed his mind as he has learned 
more� While a “panda hugger” he was 
well treated and given much “access”—
which means access to people whose job 
is to deceive you, as well as hospitality� 
In 2006, however, he published an article 
in the Wall Street Journal decisively 
repudiating his previous views—and felt 
the back of Beijing’s hand until 2013� 
Then he was able to return to China, 
as Beijing sought to shore up support, 
faced with the South China Sea crisis, 
to be discussed below (pages 129–30)�
Pillsbury is not to be believed without 
question� He has had numerous run-
ins with counterintelligence officials 
owing to his seemingly uncontrol-
lable proclivity to leak secrets—to this 
reviewer, for example, in the passenger 
seat of his vintage Jaguar motorcar� 
Here, however, we are reviewing neither 
the sales strategy nor the author of 
this book, but rather its argument� 
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BOOK REVIEWS
A BIT OF A MAVERICK
Pillsbury, Michael� The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower� New York: Henry Holt, 2015� 319pp� $30 
The book makes two fundamental 
contentions� First, Pillsbury states 
that the Asian region and the United 
States currently face the problem of 
an unexpectedly aggressive China� 
Second, he argues that this unpleasant 
surprise is no more than the product 
of decades of official self-delusion 
about Beijing, even when confronted 
with mountains of facts that supported 
opposite conclusions� This reviewer 
agrees with these two points, albeit with 
many academic caveats that will be 
spared� Disagreement arises only when 
speculation begins about the future�
For roughly forty years, from the Nixon 
diplomacy of the 1970s to about 2010, 
the idea that China could pose a threat 
militarily was considered so mistaken 
as to be effectively beyond toleration 
in either academic or governmental 
circles� The insistent conviction was that 
“engagement” would transform China 
into a strong economy, a friend, even an 
ally, and most likely a democracy as well 
(page 7)� Among the few in Washington 
not convinced by these arguments was 
the longtime head of the Pentagon’s 
Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Mar-
shall, who did much to support Pills-
bury’s work through contract research�
China is of course a new country� The 
first states having that word as part of 
their official names were founded in 
the last century: the Republic of China 
in 1911; then after the Chinese civil 
war, the People’s Republic of China in 
1949� Before that a myriad of states, 
some ethnically Chinese, some not, 
rose and fell on the East Asian plain� 
To lump them all together as a politi-
cal “China” to be treated as a histori-
cal entity having thousands of years of 
history is a profound error, as specialists 
now recognize� Still, the continuity of a 
distinct culture belonging to the Chinese 
people must not be underestimated�
If one were to undertake a compre-
hensive study of the view of force 
within this cultural tradition, the first 
consideration would be the extreme 
pacifism expressed in the classics of 
Confucianism, created two millennia 
in the past, and long official orthodoxy� 
The mainstream of Chinese thought—
not a pretense but a conviction—sees 
superior virtue and civilization as the 
way to genuine power, as is testified 
by the vast corpus of classical writings, 
memorized by scholars for generations 
and not forgotten today, as well as the 
volumes of official memorandums on 
foreign policy, in which opposition to 
force is regularly the winning argument�
Pillsbury, however, makes no claim to be 
writing about “China” in general or even 
broadly about today’s People’s Republic� 
He says little about Confucianism be-
cause others have said much, and focus-
es instead on the all-but-forbidden tradi-
tion of writers on military topics, the 
bingjia whose heyday was also two mil-
lennia ago, but whose influence has con-
tinued, like an underground stream, ever 
since, to emerge today in what Pillsbury 
calls “the Chinese hawks,” or yingpai� 
Seemingly overlooked by official Ameri-
can estimates, these hawks have no truck 
with engagement, are deeply antiforeign 
and anti-American, and seek Chinese 
hegemony to be achieved through 
deception, strategic dominance, and the 
use of particularly effective weapons 
usually called in English, rather awk-
wardly, “assassins’ maces” (shashoujian)�  
They do not lack influence� 
Pillsbury has come to know and un-
derstand this group by employing the 
most elementary but often neglected 
methods of information gathering: 
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namely, reading their work and having 
long conversations with them (he speaks 
excellent Chinese)� The results of years 
of such research, by Pillsbury and others, 
effectively upend the conventional wis-
dom of nearly half a century� The ques-
tions that follow are: First, how did we 
go wrong? And second, what to do now?
To answer the first question, “what went 
wrong,” requires going back to President 
Richard Nixon and his national security 
adviser, Henry Kissinger� That China 
would reenter the international system 
was long a near certainty in their time� 
Maoism was beginning to be recognized 
internally as having been an unmitigated 
catastrophe, not only for the Chinese 
people, but also for the military—though 
many foreigners still idolized the man� 
The Soviet Union moreover presented 
China with a threat requiring a coun-
terweight� The only question was how 
exactly China would return� Sadly, these 
two Americans devised an utterly unre-
alistic plan that set our diplomacy on a 
course that, unsurprisingly, has brought 
unexpected and baleful consequences�
Nixon and Kissinger seem to have 
imagined a future in which an intimate 
Beijing–Washington political axis would 
supersede the entire then-existing 
security system in Asia� Such a vision 
seems the only possible explanation 
for Nixon’s quite astonishing question 
to Mao when they met on 21 Febru-
ary 1972: “Is it better for Japan to be 
neutral, totally defenseless, or it is [sic] 
better for a time for Japan to have some 
relations with the United States? The 
point being—I am talking now in the 
realm of philosophy—in international 
relations there are no good choices�” 
Put bluntly, Nixon seems already to 
have decided, long before the meeting, 
to drop relations with Japan, then our 
closest ally, in favor of China� (Japan 
was of course kept in the dark�) But 
Mao was bored and somnolent as the 
two leaders spoke� Neither he nor any 
other Chinese ever took up this offer� 
How could so unrealistic an Ameri-
can policy plan have come into being? 
The answer is by wishful thinking and 
self-deception: in this case, aided by the 
rigorously selective limitation of sources 
to those that supported the policy 
already adopted� Only a tiny secret 
team knew of the plan� The books they 
read were uniformly from the strongly 
pro-Mao school of writing then current 
(Kissinger, White House Years [Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1979], p� 1051)� Other 
books, many by better scholars, existed 
but were not consulted� Likewise, the 
speaker invited to the White House to 
enlighten the Americans was the erratic 
Frenchman André Malraux� Others 
were incomparably more knowledge-
able and available—to name but two, 
the American Foreign Service officer 
Edward E� Rice and the Berlin profes-
sor Jürgen Domes—but they were not 
even contacted� Thus, information that 
had been intentionally biased formed 
the deepest foundation for our policy� 
But the longed-for axis between Beijing 
and Washington never came into be-
ing� Quite the opposite happened�
Starting in the first decade of this 
century, with now-retired leaders hold-
ing the reins, China openly changed 
its visible foreign policy to danger-
ous military adventurism, for reasons 
no one can explain� The change has 
not succeeded� Thus the conquest of 
Scarborough Shoal undertaken in spring 
2012, which Beijing no doubt expected 
to be a military cakewalk against the 
Filipinos, has turned into a military 
and diplomatic standoff, drawing in 
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more players, losing China prestige, and 
showing no sign of ending (page 203)�
It is as yet unclear that continuing  
irresponsible expansion will be the 
gravamen of President Xi Jinping’s 
foreign policy� China’s current leader 
took power in November 2012 
months after the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff began and while he has not 
repudiated the policy he seems far 
more intent on domestic reform�
China could even liberalize: recently 
the down-market and often xenophobic 
Beijing tabloid Global Times attacked 
Western “pro-China” scholars for 
insulting that country by explaining 
away repression as the only answer to 
otherwise inevitable chaos� “Western 
scholars have never imagined that 
China might have a ‘peaceful demo-
cratic transition,’” the tabloid observed 
(8 March 2015)� These astonishing 
words did not appear by accident: the 
Global Times is wholly owned by the 
party’s most authoritative mouthpiece, 
the People’s Daily. Xi must be aware that 
even small external distractions will 
almost certainly derail domestic reform� 
As for what the rest of the world should 
do, obviously it is time to prepare: to 
rearm and deter seriously� The region, 
however, is responding so robustly 
to Chinese aggression that Beijing is 
alarmed� Japan today is not a mighty 
power only because it chose to try 
peace instead� Let no one doubt that if 
Tokyo deems it necessary, it will emerge 
again—indeed that is its current  
direction—which would be perhaps the 
greatest imaginable setback possible 
for the Chinese political and economic 
future� Nearly every other state in 
Asia too, from India to the Philippines 
and beyond, is rapidly and effectively 
preparing military capabilities that 
could present China with a nightmare 
scenario in which it is at war with a 
multiplicity of capable adversaries 
along a front of more than four thou-
sand miles, from India to Tokyo� 
Pillsbury speaks of the risk of prema-
turely “asking the weight of the em-
peror’s cauldrons,” or wending (page 
196), which sounds exotic� What it 
means is showing your cards too soon� 
China has in fact done just this, with the 
consequences the Chinese sages would 
have predicted: creating failure as others 
react in time� My conclusion: we will 
certainly soon see a highly militarized 
Asia; we may see some skirmishes or 
worse (though recall that the Chinese 
esteem most those victories achieved 
without fighting; they abhor long-term, 
attritional war), but we most emphati-
cally will not see Chinese hegemony, 
either in the region or in the world�
ARTHUR WALDRON
Morris, David J� The Evil Hours: A Biography of 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. New York: Hough-
ton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015� 338pp� $27
The numbers are staggering� In 2012 
the U�S� Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) estimated that eight thousand 
veterans take their own lives every year� 
Think about that—twenty-two people 
die every day of whom many, in pain 
and having lost hope, have carried their 
war with them for far too long� For 
some it may have been recent fight-
ing in Afghanistan or Iraq; for others 
it may have been decades ago in the 
jungles of Southeast Asia� Regardless, 
the trauma these people experienced 
knows no boundaries between deserts 
and mountains, between marshes and 
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oceans� Or as the great First World War 
poet Wilfred Owen said: “These are men 
whose minds the Dead have ravished�”
David J� Morris, former Marine infantry 
officer turned war correspondent, tells 
us that post-traumatic stress disorder, 
or PTSD, as it is commonly known, has 
been called many things throughout his-
tory: shell shock, combat exhaustion, the 
blues, or simply being worn down and 
played out� It’s a condition that “went 
unacknowledged for millennia � � � and is 
now the fourth most common psychi-
atric disorder in the United States�” Not 
until 1980, when PTSD was added to the 
psychiatric manual—the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
or DSM—did PTSD get more attention�
Morris’s book is not only timely— 
arriving at the end of two long wars—
but it is grand in its ambition and scope� 
Similarly to Siddhartha Mukherjee’s 
approach in his Pulitzer Prize–winning 
book, The Emperor of All Maladies: A 
Biography of Cancer, Morris covers the 
history of trauma and war; how trauma 
affects the mind; the therapies that are 
often used to fight it; the drugs that 
are prescribed to numb it; and some 
alternatives to modern medicine� But 
what makes it truly a powerful book, 
beyond a journalist’s endeavor, is that 
PTSD is personal to Morris� His book is 
an exploration that begins with basic yet 
difficult questions: “Why does the world 
seem so different after I got back from 
Iraq? Why do I feel so out of place now? 
What does one do with the knowledge 
gained from a near death experience?”
In October 2007, in the middle of the 
surge, Morris was imbedded with the 
Army’s 1st Infantry Division� While 
riding in a Humvee in the volatile 
neighborhood of Saydia in southwestern 
Baghdad, his patrol was attacked� The 
Humvee in which Morris was riding 
was hit by an improvised explosive 
device� Battered and bent, the vehicle 
held together and the patrol was able to 
get back to its forward operating base� 
Morris escaped serious physical injury, 
and after a short medical examination 
he left Iraq and was back in Califor-
nia a week later� The explosion would 
change his life� It would lead him on a 
long journey, trying to understand his 
experience, through literature, research, 
and writing� It left him with nightmares 
and anger� It left him sitting in VA 
centers watching others suffer silently, 
with shaking legs and blank stares�
Morris tells us, in beautiful, searing 
language, that “we are born in debt, ow-
ing the world a death� This is the shadow 
that darkens every cradle� Trauma is 
what happens when you catch a surprise 
glimpse of that darkness, the coming 
annihilation not only of the body and 
the mind but also, seemingly, of the 
world�” And yet the world is still trying 
to understand how trauma affects us� 
Not surprisingly, the science is mixed� 
Some therapies have empirical evidence 
showing that they help trauma victims—
whether it is combat trauma or one of 
the other big-T traumas that Morris 
describes� The big-T traumas are those 
that are soul crushing—airplane  
crashes, extended combat, rape, physi-
cal assault, and natural disasters� These 
are the traumas that overwhelm our 
brains and destroy our sense of time�
The VA’s response to trauma patients, 
the “gold standard” therapies, focuses 
on two types: prolonged exposure and 
cognitive processing therapies� Most 
have heard of prolonged exposure� It is 
essentially a reliving of the event, over 
and over, in which the patient, with help 
from a therapist, is trying to change 
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the stimulus to the traumatic event� Yet 
there is no consensus on what the best 
treatment for PTSD may be� For as Mor-
ris notes, the “gold standard” treatments 
often do not account for those that 
leave the program prior to completion� 
Drugs are just as questionable� Some 
drugs, like selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors—Prozac and Zoloft—have 
been around for years, and are the more 
popular drugs prescribed for PTSD� 
And like many of the therapies, some 
patients find that the drugs help them� 
Then there are drugs like propranolol, 
originally developed to prevent heart 
attacks, which now challenge our ethics 
on how we deal with trauma victims� 
That is because propranolol, when 
provided correctly, can inhibit the 
brain’s ability to etch a traumatic event 
in your mind if taken within a few hours 
of the traumatic event� This is a drug 
that can disrupt the brain’s ability to 
embrace a memory; it can change our 
sense of self� Morris rightly raises the 
concern that messing with our “flight 
or fight response” can fundamentally 
alter what we view as dangerous or not�
In the end, we are reminded that as 
humans we are idiosyncratic creatures— 
each of us responds to traumatic events 
in our own way� Therapies that work 
for some do not necessarily work for 
others� Just the simple act of listening 
to our bodies—say, practicing yoga—is 
a powerful therapy for some PTSD 
patients� As for Morris himself, he 
does not discount anything that might 
work for you, even if that is a moder-
ate amount of alcohol; if it works, then 
consider it a remedy, or just another 
way to make it through the day�
The Evil Hours is not simply a book for 
combat veterans and service members� 
It is a book that deserves a much wider 
audience� Trauma and the suffering 
and pain that follow have been with us 
since Homer’s time and will be with us 
for many more years to come� David J� 
Morris has shed much needed light on 
this all-too-human and -deadly thing�
CHRISTOPHER NELSON
Jones, Charles A� More than Just War: Narratives 
of the Just War Tradition and Military Life� Lon-
don: Routledge, 2013� 224pp� $120 (Kindle $33) 
Pedestrian forms of philosophical in-
novation often involve the application of 
old ideas to new cases� It should there-
fore come as no surprise that the creative 
bulk of what is published today on the 
ethics of war achieves its novelty 
—when it does at all—by applying 
the just war tradition to hitherto-
unexamined aspects of contemporary 
warfare, for example, drones and 
unmanned systems, cyber warfare, 
intelligence and covert operations, 
asymmetric warfare, and terrorism�
Now, this is a useful thing to do; it has 
expanded conceptual categories within 
the literature on the ethics of war (e�g�, 
the jus post bellum and jus in intelli-
gencia)� But it falls short of that deeper 
kind of philosophy that overthrows 
preconceptions and generates entirely 
new areas of rational inquiry� This more 
difficult (but potentially more fruitful) 
way to innovate in philosophy would 
call into question the entire edifice 
of knowledge that, through univer-
sity schooling or professional military 
education, everyone takes for granted 
when discussing the ethics of war� 
Charles A� Jones does exactly this in his 
provocative, original, fun-to-read, and 
tightly argued book More than Just War: 
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Narratives of the Just War Tradition and 
Military Life. Jones is Emeritus Reader in 
International Relations at the University 
of Cambridge, and such a conceptual 
tour de force is exactly what one might 
expect from a Cambridge don by com-
parison to many military authors who 
understandably confine their work to 
areas of their own tactical expertise� By 
contrast, Jones offers perhaps one of the 
most interesting and penetrating theses 
about the ethics of war since Michael 
Walzer’s classic Just and Unjust Wars�
Jones shows that the pithy stories that 
appear in almost every book or ar-
ticle about the just war tradition, tales 
that narrate the tradition’s cumulative 
development from venerable origins to 
postwar resurgence, mask important 
complexities crucial to understand-
ing its applicability to contemporary 
warfare� Since the 1960s, the resilience 
and ubiquity of just war discourse, 
combined with continual reference to 
late-classical and medieval theologians 
in contemporary texts, give the impres-
sion that a continued and coherent 
“tradition” of thought about war existed 
and continues to develop� Yet, Jones 
argues, careful examination reveals that 
just war thinking was largely ignored 
from the middle of the seventeenth 
century only to be revived in the middle 
of the twentieth� What is now spoken 
of as if it were an unbroken tradition 
owes its veneer of coherence to resus-
citation by modern scholarship� Upon 
close examination, both selectivity and 
instrumentality characterize its revival�
Alongside this historical critique, Jones 
exposes contemporary just war doctrine 
for its implicit adherence to a set of as-
sumptions that he argues are objection-
able when applied to contemporary war-
fare� For example, the doctrines of jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum assume the van-
tage point of the state over the individual 
and have a difficult time dealing with 
unorthodox forms of modern warfare� 
Just war doctrine assumes a conception 
of ethics that is rule oriented and largely 
ignores character—something actual 
militaries spend a lot of time cultivat-
ing� Finally, the doctrine’s origin is 
more wedded to religious theology than 
most secular philosophers (like Michael 
Walzer) and champions of international 
law (like Yoram Dinstein) today admit�
Jones brings to light an intriguing di-
chotomy between the way practitioners 
and authors closest to war account for its 
normative dimensions, on the one hand, 
and the narrowness of just war discourse 
on the other� An intriguing question gets 
raised: How did this dichotomy between 
theory and practice come about? More 
than Just War answers by offering a 
different account of how the just war 
doctrine became what it is today, an ar-
tificial “tradition” unable to account for 
the most interesting normative aspect 
of modern warfare—the phenomenol-
ogy experienced by war’s participants 
themselves� An alternative tradition of 
military ethics, Jones says, exists along-
side the just war doctrine� This tradition, 
found in both film and literature, fills 
the experiential gaps that the just war 
doctrine leaves barren� Any account 
of military ethics that ignores both 
traditions will suffer from this neglect�
Perhaps the most intriguing part 
of Jones’s book offers a penetrating 
survey of a variety of authors within 
this latter tradition� Works by William 
Shakespeare, Sir Walter Scott, James 
Fenimore Cooper, Stephen Crane, 
John Buchan, Robert Louis Stevenson, 
Joseph Conrad, Tim O’Brien, and Kurt 
Vonnegut are featured� Since many of 
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these will be familiar to students, More 
than Just War makes for an excel-
lent supplement to the curriculum 
at military service academies, war 
colleges, and civilian institutions�
While the book’s strength rests in its 
ability to unmask the just war tradition 
critically and outline its alternative, 
there are several points where the author 
could have done more to substantiate 
the philosophical views that under-
gird the argument’s positive side� For 
example, Jones leans quite heavily on the 
American pragmatism of John Dewey 
without fleshing out the exact connec-
tions between Dewey’s epistemology 
and his own� Nevertheless, since most 
readers will be nonphilosophers such 
omissions are the slightest of concerns�
At over one hundred dollars (hard-
bound), the book’s expense may 
be prohibitive for many� Routledge 
is expected to offer a less expen-
sive paperback sometime in 2015� 
Meanwhile, an affordable digital 
(Kindle) version is available�
JOSEPH M� HATFIELD
Biggar, Nigel� In Defence of War. Oxford, U�K�: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2013� 384pp� $55 (paperback 
$30)
Nigel Biggar is Regis Professor of Moral 
and Pastoral Theology and Director of 
the McDonald Centre for Theology, 
Ethics, and Public Life at the Univer-
sity of Oxford� This volume collects 
seven essays on various aspects of the 
just war tradition� It is very much a 
book of theological ethics, although 
in strong dialogue with contemporary 
philosophical just war thinking and the 
international legal framework of the law 
of armed conflict� Although the essays 
are to some degree independent of each 
other, they are united by Biggar’s clear 
and consistent theological perspective�
Anyone familiar with the culture of 
“mainline” Protestantism and much 
liberal Roman Catholicism will recog-
nize that these traditions, at least since 
the Vietnam War, have moved strongly 
toward positions that are to various 
degrees close to pacifism� Some are 
straightforwardly pacifist—a position 
most closely identified with the Ameri-
can theologian Stanley Hauerwas� Some 
Roman Catholic organizations such 
as Pax Christi are on this end of the 
spectrum as well� Others hold a position 
generally called “just war pacifism” in 
that they continue to use the categories 
of just war, but apply them in such a way 
that almost no actual conflict could meet 
them (by, for example, interpreting “last 
resort” as requiring one to do literally 
everything conceivable short of war)� A 
position called “just peacemaking” has 
emerged in many denominations as pref-
erable to just war, stressing anticipatory 
actions to be taken to prevent war over 
the necessity of the use of force in some 
circumstances� Biggar’s first two chapters 
address these trends directly, arguing 
against the coherence of the pacifist view 
and in favor of a meaningful sense in 
which Christian love can be manifest, 
even in the midst of military conflict�
The next two chapters take up two cen-
tral principles of classic Christian just 
war thinking: double effect (in which a 
given action is militarily desirable but 
also has a foreseen, but not intended, 
“evil” effect such as destruction of civil-
ian lives and property) and proportion-
ality� The principle of double effect has 
been under considerable criticism from 
philosophers, who prefer to reduce it to 
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utilitarian calculus, and from Christian 
thinkers who worry that it smacks of 
hairsplitting casuistry. Biggar strongly 
defends it, noting that a hallmark of dis-
tinctively Christian ethics is its attention 
to the intentional state of the actor—an 
emphasis that reaches all the way back 
to the Sermon on the Mount. Christian 
ethics has always maintained what the 
Germans call a Gesinnungsethik—an eth-
ic of intention. Therefore the “foreseen 
but not intended” requirement of double 
effect captures that in an essential way.
The proportionality requirement of just 
war appears on both the jus ad bellum 
and the jus in bello sides of the just war 
ledger. Biggar’s fourth chapter considers 
it on the jus ad bellum side and takes up 
the most challenging of cases to test it: 
World War I. In the face of widespread 
belief that World War I was a blunder 
and certainly not worth its vast toll, 
Biggar argues that it indeed was worth it. 
While this reviewer didn’t find the argu-
ment completely persuasive, it is closely 
and carefully argued and provides an 
excellent presentation of an uncommon-
ly held and therefore provocative view.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with questions of 
the relationship of international law to 
the parallel ethical tradition of just war. 
Against black-letter-law fundamental-
ism, Biggar strives in these chapters to 
establish the principle that the ethical 
tradition is deeper and may on occasion 
trump the legal. Some contemporary 
philosophers (most notably David Rodin 
and Jeff McMahan) critique aspects of 
just war tradition from the perspec-
tive of a modern liberal rights-based 
perspective. In particular, they attack 
the traditional division of responsibil-
ity in war between the political leaders 
who make the decision to go to war in 
the first place (jus ad bellum) and the 
soldiers who do the actual fighting (who 
bear no responsibility for the over-
all justice of the war, but only for the 
conduct within the war [jus in bello]). 
They challenge the “moral equality of 
soldiers,” which holds that soldiers on 
both sides are not culpable for the killing 
they do as long as they fight within the 
bounds of the law of armed conflict. In 
their account, at least one side in any 
war must be wrong in fighting it, and 
therefore the soldiers who prosecute that 
side are not morally equivalent to their 
opponents. Biggar rigorously critiques 
this account, while granting it flows 
from the ethical framework its advocates 
are bringing to bear on the issue. But 
that is itself the problem, as Biggar sees 
it: the older and deeper traditions of 
Christian just war, he asserts, provide 
the resources and show the wisdom 
of retaining the traditional account.
Biggar also challenges the complete 
adequacy of the current international 
system in capturing fully legitimate 
decisions to use military force in the first 
place. According to the legal framework 
of sovereign states, possessed of politi-
cal sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
response to aggression is the “gold stan-
dard” justification for the use of force. 
At least since the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928, and certainly according to a close 
reading of the Charter of the United 
Nations, states may use force only when 
responding to aggression, when assisting 
another state responding to aggression, 
or when part of a collective security ac-
tion authorized by the United Nations. 
Biggar uses the Kosovo conflict as one 
that clearly falls outside that normative 
legal framework and yet, he argues, was 
absolutely necessary as an ethical matter.
The book concludes with another 
hard case: the war in Iraq beginning 
in 2003. Against those who argue the 
war was justified on manufactured 
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and dishonest grounds and not worth 
the cost, Biggar once again provides 
a clearly argued case that the cost 
was justified� Whether readers come 
away persuaded or not, Biggar’s argu-
ment will sharpen their thinking�
Biggar’s is very much a theological 
book, and therefore mostly of inter-
est to readers interested in a strong 
normative Christian argument� In that 
context, whether one is persuaded on 
every detail or not, it is a welcome tonic 
among the often shallow and sloppy 
thinking about war and the international 
system from some Christian circles� 
Yet there is value in the book even for 
readers who may not share the full 
theological view� It certainly brings a 
historical depth to the discussion that 
much contemporary philosophical just 
war thinking does not, detached as it is 
from the long historical tradition in the 
West Biggar represents, and attempting 
to grapple with the ethical problem of 
war with a comparatively small tool kit�
MARTIN L� COOK
Pattee, Phillip G� At War in Distant Waters: Brit-
ish Colonial Defense in the Great War� Annapolis, 
Md�: Naval Institute Press, 2013� 274pp� $59�95
Phillip Pattee, a retired naval officer and 
professor at the U�S� Army Command 
and General Staff College, examines 
British efforts before the First World 
War to craft a global maritime strategy 
to deal with threats that were expected 
to arise during a war with Germany� In 
doing so, he makes a compelling case 
that British naval thinkers were not 
completely fixated on the German High 
Seas Fleet, nor were they unconscious 
of the critical need to keep the sea-lanes 
of commerce and communication open 
for their merchant navy and England’s 
national economy� Threats included 
the inevitability of impossibly high 
insurance rates during times of war, 
the combat capability of the overseas 
German East Asia squadron, and the 
possibility of persistent predations by 
German raiders� British leaders also 
understood that, despite the size of 
the Royal Navy, British assets would 
initially be stretched thin, as most 
British capital ships would be kept in 
home waters to respond to potential 
action by their German counterparts� 
Pattee discusses British efforts to over-
come these threats� His review of British 
involvement in insurance programs de-
signed to keep merchant vessels in trade 
is fascinating and illuminates what must 
be one of the least known programs of 
the First World War� Strategies to deal 
with the German East Asia squadron, 
raiders, and shore-based supporting 
communication systems are better 
known, but Pattee still does them justice� 
Taken all together, At War in Distant 
Waters is a useful addition to a com-
plete account of the First World War�
However, this book could have been 
much more� For starters, the title is mis-
leading� Although the book chronicles 
actions taken in colonial waters, the 
depicted purpose is much more aimed 
at defending Britain, not its colonies� 
Nor does Pattee convincingly prove 
that Great Britain conquered German 
colonies to provide maritime secu-
rity� Although some actions, such as 
the seizing or destruction of German 
high-frequency radio installations, were 
designed for this purpose, others, such 
as the conquest of German Southwest 
Africa, were not� Britain could have 
easily conducted limited operations and 
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denied naval basing and support from 
the German colonies� A major second 
African front, although sensible for 
other reasons, was not needed to protect 
seaborne trade� Additionally, the book 
is surprisingly dry, when it definitely 
did not need to be so� The eradication of 
German raiders from the world’s oceans 
is a remarkable story, complete with 
drama, excitement, and extraordinary 
personalities� Spee’s one-sided German 
victory at Coronel and his subsequent 
defeat at the Falklands were two of the 
major naval battles of the war, yet are 
given short shrift by Pattee� The tale of 
Count Felix von Luckner and his raider 
Seeadler, although occurring after the 
raider threat was greatly diminished, 
would provide a compelling illustration 
of the challenges in hunting down a 
gifted and tenacious raider captain�  
Pattee does relate the story of SMS  
Königsberg, but in such a brief man-
ner as not to do justice to the very real 
concerns the cruiser created for the 
Admiralty, or the sheer magnitude of 
effort it took to destroy the warship� To 
compound matters, Pattee claims the 
destruction of Königsberg was carried 
out by two mortar-equipped barges� 
This is an error� To put Königsberg out of 
commission, the Admiralty dispatched 
the monitors HMS Mersey and HMS 
Severn on a long and hazardous journey 
to the Rufiji delta, where Königsberg 
was hiding, to sink it� For a book of 
this nature, this error is surprising�
While Pattee does include a description 
and evaluation of British operations in 
Mesopotamia—and ties these actions to 
the strategic importance of oil—the book 
is strangely silent on the Dardanelles 
campaign and the U-boat war� Perhaps 
this is because Pattee does not see the 
Mediterranean or Atlantic as “colonial” 
waters, or because neither Gallipoli 
nor submarines figured sufficiently in 
prewar planning� Still, each of these 
challenges either demanded or resulted 
from evolving British strategies and 
both would seem worthy of inclusion�
Still, when all is said and done, Pattee 
has contributed to a deeper understand-
ing of British—and German—maritime 
strategy in the First World War� By 
shifting focus away from the North Sea 
and the clashes between the Grand and 
High Seas Fleets, he has reminded the 
reader that British maritime leaders 
understood global vulnerabilities and 
planned to deal with them long be-
fore the guns of August opened fire�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Appelbaum, Peter C� Loyal Sons: Jews in the Ger-
man Army in the Great War. London: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 2014� 347pp� $79�95
Centennial commemoration and obser-
vance of the First World War have gen-
erated many books studying major and 
minor aspects of what was hoped would 
be the “war to end all wars,” or as H� G� 
Wells titled a 1914 book, The War That 
Will End War. It wasn’t; instead, it was 
the first act of a century-long tragedy� 
The present volume provides a sig-
nificant study of the more than 100,000 
German-Jewish and 320,000 Austro- 
Hungarian Jewish soldiers serving 
during the war� One in eight was killed� 
First World War historian Jay Winter is 
correct when he writes in the volume’s 
foreword, “we owe a debt to Peter Appel-
baum for bringing to light the Jewish el-
ement in this tragic story�” The volume is 
groundbreaking in its scope and depth� 
The volume consists of eight chapters 
and four appendixes� The first chapter 
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provides an overview of Jewish soldiers 
in the armies of the German states from 
the Prussian Wars of Liberation begin-
ning in 1813 until the beginning of the 
First World War� The quest for respected 
and accepted service was part of the 
larger Jewish experience of nationalism 
and participation in German society 
and met with varied results� Although 
no Jew ever attended or graduated from 
the Prussian Military or Naval Academy, 
there were Jewish officers in the prewar 
Bavarian army and Austro-Hungarian 
army� The second chapter looks at mo-
bilization and German-Jewish attitudes 
at the outbreak of the war� The outbreak 
of the war furthered German-Jewish 
patriotism� While there were dissent-
ing, pacifist Jewish voices, they were 
largely ignored and overcome by Jewish 
organizations and individuals who 
published calls to volunteer� German-
Jewish society responded at all levels and 
all ages� As the war progressed the initial 
zeal was replaced by calls for service 
based on duty (Pflicht) and honor (Ehre)� 
German Jews entered service with hopes 
and confidence of no anti-Semitism� 
They were misguided� The third chapter 
studies in detail the experiences and 
opposing views of the war of two officers 
who served on the western front, Julius 
Marx and Herbert Sulzbach� This chap-
ter and the fourth chapter, which looks 
at diaries and memoirs from the front, 
show the diversity of experiences and 
perspectives of religious and nonreli-
gious Jews, all fighting with national loy-
alty, patriotism, and pride� The chapters 
also provide a good snapshot of ever-
present Christian-Jewish sentiments�
With respect to naval matters and 
the Kriegsmarine, there is little avail-
able information on Jewish sailors� By 
geography and profession, maritime 
life was not a significant part of the 
experience of German Jews� However, 
Jews did serve in the Kriegsmarine 
aboard surface vessels and U-boats� The 
fourth chapter provides information 
on these activities, noting that the 1916 
census of Jews in the military (Juden-
zählung) registered 134 in maritime 
service� At least thirty were killed, some 
in the May 1916 battle of Jutland�
Chapter 5 studies the experiences of 
German Jews who served as physi-
cians, physician assistants, and medical 
orderlies� It shows that Jewish participa-
tion spanned the strata of society and 
reminds readers of the pain and trauma 
of those who were wounded and dying� 
This chapter is enriched by the author’s 
knowledge and experience from his 
first career of forty years as a physician, 
microbiologist, and professor of pathol-
ogy� The sixth chapter moves to the air 
and looks at the approximately 250 Jews 
who served in airships and single-engine 
aircraft� Several pilots were killed, 
several became prisoners of war, and 
others—such as Fritz Beckhardt, who 
was credited with seventeen recog-
nized kills—garnered fame and glory� 
By 1916 there was rising anti-Semitism 
on the home front and rumors that 
Jewish service and sacrifice were not 
comparable to those of non-Jews� The 
seventh chapter recounts these rumors 
and perceptions and the solution of 
the landmark Judenzählung. The final 
chapter provides an analysis, epilogue, 
and transition to the interwar years� 
In an attempt to counteract grow-
ing anti-Semitism during the postwar 
period German-Jewish veterans banded 
together in 1919 and formed the Reichs-
bund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten (Associa-
tion of Jewish Front Veterans)� One of 
the main activities was the publication of 
a monthly newspaper and other works 
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attempting to neutralize anti-Semitic 
agitation. All of this effort was shattered 
by the National Socialists after Kristall-
nacht (1938) and the anti-Semitism 
experienced during the First World 
War culminated in the anti-Semitic 
tragedies of the Second World War. 
The present volume is Appelbaum’s 
second book addressing the Jewish 
military experience of the era. The 
earlier work, Loyalty Betrayed: Jewish 
Chaplains in the German Army during 
the First World War (2013), received 
significant attention and acclaim and 
Loyal Sons is deserving of the same.
Appelbaum delves deeply into pub-
lished and unpublished diaries, letters, 
and memoirs of those who served. For 
the first time, widespread personal and 
archival materials are gathered and 
analyzed in a single source. The work 
is meticulously researched, well writ-
ten, and enjoyable to read. The author 
has produced a volume that bridges the 
chasm between studies for academic 
specialists and works for general readers. 
It is a welcome addition to the military 
history bookshelf that is lively, engag-
ing, and thorough. The appendixes and 
numerous photographs are interest-
ing and enhance the work. Loyal Sons 
deserves a wide readership and will not 
disappoint even the most casual reader.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY
Vaill, Amanda. Hotel Florida: Truth, Love, and 
Death in the Spanish Civil War. New York: Farrar, 
Straus, Giroux, 2014. 436pp. $30
Spain was the only nation to take up 
arms against fascism in the years im-
mediately preceding the outbreak of the 
Second World War. England, France, 
and the United States did not act against 
this impending threat. While the Span-
ish Civil War began as an internal do-
mestic matter between the newly elected 
Spanish Republic and reactionary 
Nationalist forces led by General Franco, 
the conflict would draw in Germany and 
Italy in support of Franco, and the Soviet 
Union in support of the Republic. The 
conflict pitted forces of Europe’s far left 
and right against each other, eventually 
overshadowing the Spanish Republic’s 
attempt to maintain power. Against this 
backdrop, Amanda Vaill follows the lives 
and fates of three couples. She weaves 
their lives and fates into the larger fate 
of Spain as Europe’s only stand against 
fascism collapses under the weight of 
Franco’s forces in early 1939. In do-
ing so, she provides the reader with an 
overview of the political and military 
events of the Spanish Civil War, as well 
as minibiographies of six eyewitnesses 
to the war in an eminently readable 
and gripping account of the savage war 
that ended with the fall of Madrid. 
Vaill’s characters are presented in pairs. 
They are couples, romantically and 
professionally. The first to appear is 
the chief of the Spanish government’s 
foreign press office in Madrid, Arturo 
Barea, and his future wife, Ilsa Kulcsar, 
an Austrian radical who has come to 
Spain after the war begins. Spain’s tragic 
fate is most explicitly illustrated through 
Barea’s slow descent from moderately 
prominent government official to ordi-
nary refugee, finally settling in France 
with Ilsa. His observations on the Spain 
of his youth contrast with the savagery of 
the conflict between Republican and Na-
tionalist forces that takes place through-
out the book. Following Barea and 
Kulcsar, Vaill presents the Hungarian- 
born André Friedmann, who would 
come to be known as Robert Capa, 
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one of the greatest war photographers 
of all time. His relationship with the 
similarly gifted and prominent photog-
rapher Gerda Taro (Gerta Pohorylle) 
forms much of the central narrative 
of the book. Finally, American novel-
ists, journalists, and war correspon-
dents Ernest Hemingway and Martha 
Gellhorn are the third couple, rounding 
out the book’s six main characters.
Hotel Florida is much more than just an 
account of the Spanish Civil War—or 
the story of the six main characters 
during those years. It is as much a story 
about the nature of truth and reality in 
wartime as it is a gripping narrative of 
the seminal conflict of the interwar years 
in Europe. Vaill’s characters become who 
they are through their interaction with 
the war, and they create themselves—
and the meaning of their own lives—as 
much as they create accounts of the war’s 
events, whether through the written 
word or the photograph. Their stories 
and pictures are in many cases used for 
propaganda purposes, and the charac-
ters know this. However, the fine line 
between truth and propaganda largely 
disappears, if it is ever distinguishable 
in the first place. With the exception of 
Barea and Kulcsar, the characters want 
to be close to the fighting, to see the 
troops and the refugees and the destruc-
tion caused by the war, so that they can 
capture its meaning and portray the 
tragedy to the world, which does not 
seem to understand the importance 
of defeating fascism. A host of minor 
characters appear, many of whom are 
fighters in the various International Bri-
gades (to include the famous Abraham 
Lincoln Battalion of American volun-
teers). These characters might as well 
have walked right out of a Hemingway 
novel—tough whiskey drinkers hunting 
fascists and eating trout and vegetables 
cooked over a fire. In fact Hotel Florida 
itself reads like a novel, and it is no 
irony that the book concludes with the 
first sentence of For Whom the Bell Tolls 
as Hemingway begins to type the first 
page, transferring his Spanish experi-
ence into his greatest literary work. 
This book offers something for not 
only the student of European history, 
military history, or literature. It is a 
first-rate account of the political and 
military events of the Spanish Civil 
War. It is also a deeply philosophical 
examination of the relationship among 
war, truth, and propaganda. It asks hard 
questions that are immediately relevant 
today even as the media landscape has 
changed dramatically; the fundamentals 
of human nature have remained such 
that any of the main characters of this 
book could sympathize with reporters, 
photographers, and journalists today. I 
highly recommend this brilliant book 
to scholars and general readers alike. 
JEFFREY M. SHAW
Bayles, Martha. Through a Screen Darkly: Popu-
lar Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America’s Im-
age Abroad. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 
2014. 336pp. $30
This is a wonderful, wonderful book. 
It is very much more than even its 
title and subtitle suggest. And it’s a 
great read even though it deals with 
subjects and policy debates about 
which most of us would rather not 
think because they’re either upset-
ting, or too complicated, or both.
The first half of the book is devoted 
to the image of America that our low 
(and getting lower all the time) popu-
lar culture projects worldwide. When 
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I embarked on reading it, I was in-
timidated by how much of our popular 
culture Martha Bayles proposed to cover 
in detail by focusing on (seemingly) so 
many individual products� I felt I already 
knew how vulgar and vile the mov-
ies and television shows we export are� 
When the author started in on Sex in the 
City, I thought, “Well, better her than me 
at least: somebody needs to know about 
this particular offense, but not me�”
Then, I discovered that Bayles very clev-
erly combined her assessment of how 
that television program gives a debased 
view of America with the reactions of 
interviewees abroad� Every example (and 
there is a myriad of them in chapters 
“The American Way of Sex,” “Empire 
of Special Effects,” “Television by the 
People, for the People?,” and “From Pop 
Idol to Vox Populi”) proceeds in this 
way� While she means us to look at and 
understand the attraction of and “push 
back” against American pop culture 
from place to place abroad, she provides 
excellent analyses of the indigenous pop 
culture and non-American influences� 
This takes one into society and politics 
as much as culture, religion, taste, and 
inevitable interesting peculiarities� The 
outcome is a nearly complete global 
vision of popular culture that I don’t 
believe can be found anywhere else� Of 
course, Bayles means to show the guid-
ing influence of American pop culture�
In dealing with popular culture, Bayles 
is slyly operating in the way in which 
she will eventually commend that public 
(or culture) diplomats proceed� She 
holds that public diplomacy is made up 
of four activities: listening, advocacy, 
culture and exchange, and news report-
ing� These ought to be discrete from one 
another but given equal importance� 
Accordingly, a cultural officer ought to 
be able to tell foreigners how Americans 
really regard Sex in the City (no one 
takes the show as real or expressive of 
his or her attitude toward life); be able 
to explain how certain things fit (or 
don’t fit) into the real American ethos 
(this is the advocacy part); know enough 
about the local culture to understand 
the “push back” that should always be 
sought; and, finally, tell the truth�
In addition to the foregoing, this book 
does several other things, and all of 
them excellently� Bayles is well versed in 
American political thought and history 
—enough to produce a fine essay on 
the American ethos that combines the 
historical, political, and cultural into 
what is really American� Again, this is 
an example of what every U�S� pub-
lic diplomat should know and what 
those abroad might learn if public 
diplomacy were properly practiced�
The book is also a thorough history of 
U�S� public diplomacy, from the first 
master, Benjamin Franklin, through the 
shutting down of the U�S� Information 
Agency (USIA) in 1999, to the pres-
ent� While she believes the abolition of 
the USIA was a mistake, the book does 
not advocate its revival� This is because 
Bayles is clearly more concerned with 
the content of government-provided 
information about America since the 
early 1950s (which is a distressing his-
tory) than she is about the institutions�
On top of it all, Bayles treats most 
related subjects—for example, the 
experiment in “strategic communica-
tions” as a kind of public diplomacy 
inflicted on the Department of Defense 
after 9/11 (and terminated by Admiral 
Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011); the history 
of the tight relationship between Hol-
lywood and Washington that secured 
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the worldwide domination of American 
pop culture, while allowing its content 
to sink lower and lower; the troubled 
career of U�S� international broadcast; 
and the Internet and social media�
And yes, she deals also with the problem 
of U�S� promotion of democracy abroad� 
To quote from the last sentences of the 
book: “The premise of this book has 
been that a significant number, perhaps 
even a preponderance, of today’s tiny 
battles are being fought not in the news 
media but in the mundane realm of 
popular culture� The wisdom of America 
is clear and straightforward: political 
liberty can be sustained only by self-
governing individuals and prudently 
designed institutions� Yet when our 
fellow human beings look at America 
through the screen of our entertainment, 
what they see most darkly is a rejection 
of tradition, religion, family and every 
kind of institutional restraint, in favor 
of unseemly egotism and libertinism� 
Attracted and repulsed by this image, 
they might be forgiven for not appreci-
ating the part about self-governance�” 
KENNETH D� M� JENSEN
Sander, Robert D� Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam 
Son 719� Norman: Univ� of Oklahoma Press, 
2014� 304pp� $29�95
“The only chance we have is to initiate 
bold moves against the enemy,” na-
tional security adviser Henry Kissinger 
confided in 1971� This was his advice to 
the administration of President Nixon, 
which sought to end the Vietnam War 
by creating “peace with honor�” “Bold 
moves” would include two new strate-
gies� One was resumed bombing of 
North Vietnam� The second would 
be new ground raids into Cambodia 
and Laos to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail—the network that allowed Hanoi 
to supply communist forces in the 
south, and that at its peak even in-
cluded an oil pipeline from the Chinese 
border to the environs of Saigon� The 
raid into Laos, code-named LAM SON 
719, is the subject of Robert Sander’s 
recent book Invasion of Laos, 1971.
Despite the term “invasion” in the 
book’s title, LAM SON 719 was designed 
as a cross-border raid on the town of 
Tchepone� It was here communist mili-
tary supplies were shifted from trucks to 
porters, bicycles, and pack animals� The 
town had received attention from Amer-
ican military planners as early as the 
Kennedy administration� Sander quotes 
General Westmoreland explaining to 
General Abrams in March 1968, “I’d like 
to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the 
tickets�” Westmoreland’s plans called for 
at least four divisions to undertake the 
assault� For its part, the government of 
Saigon had been planning an operation 
into Laos from at least 1965� In real-
ity, as Sander notes, the United States 
had been conducting CIA and covert 
air operations in Laos since the 1950s�
President Nixon’s policies of détente 
and outreach to China meant a reduc-
tion of the chance that expanding the 
war into “neutral” Laos would trig-
ger Soviet or Chinese response�
Congressional restrictions designed 
to limit the war meant that American 
involvement in the 1971 operation 
would be confined to supporting roles in 
artillery and fire support� Yet, as Sander 
points out, this was still a bloody battle 
for the Americans� American casualties 
ran high, with over two hundred killed 
and at least 1,100 injured� Sander, who 
was a pilot during the battle, observes 
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that “U�S� Army helicopter crews 
endured incomparably higher losses 
during this two-month operation in 
heavily defended airspace than during 
any other period of the Vietnam War�” 
The overall impact on the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail was limited but communist 
forces suffered at least thirteen thousand 
casualties, and the offensive blunted 
any North Vietnamese attempts to 
strike at withdrawing American forces� 
The withdrawal at the conclusion of 
the operation was memorialized by 
journalists who photographed Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
soldiers hanging on to the skids of 
returning American helicopters� 
The operation’s overall dismal results 
were not due to a lack of ARVN bravery, 
Sander argues, but to poor operational 
planning and politics� Indeed, the ARVN 
suffered some 7,500 casualties out of 
the seventeen thousand soldiers com-
mitted to the operation� Rather, the 
ARVN battle plan for LAM SON 719 “was 
complex, far too complex for a corps 
commander and staff that had never 
conducted corps-sized operations�” 
In Washington, the Army’s Vice Chief of 
Staff, General Bruce Palmer, remarked 
that “only a Patton or a MacArthur 
would have made such a daring move; 
an Eisenhower or a Bradley would 
not have attempted it�” Yet, at the start 
of 1971, South Vietnam had such an 
officer: General Tri, the daring corps 
commander who had led the success-
ful Cambodia offensive� General Tri’s 
bravado extended to his trademark 
swagger stick and stylish sunglasses� 
Tragically, General Tri died in a he-
licopter crash en route to take com-
mand of the stalled Laos offensive� 
Sander identified the operation’s relative 
failure as “the unintended consequences 
of a decision to launch a major military 
operation involving corps from two 
nations that did not share a common 
objective�” While President Nixon 
“hoped to prevent the North Vietnamese 
from launching an offensive that could 
endanger, and even delay, withdrawal 
of American forces remaining in 
Vietnam,” South Vietnamese president 
Thiệu’s ultimate “objective was to give 
South Vietnam more time to prepare 
to meet the North Vietnamese with-
out direct U�S� military assistance and 
without sacrificing his best divisions�”
American frustration during the op-
eration was compounded by President 
Thiệu’s refusal to commit ARVN reserve 
forces to the battle� Sander suggests that 
many of these unused ARVN divisions 
were less than combat ready� Many 
were hampered by soldiers who spoke 
regional dialects and had strong ties 
to their local areas and could not be 
deployed far from home without fears of 
desertion� ARVN readiness was affected 
by another problem on which Sander 
does not dwell: “flower soldiers�” By the 
early 1970s, South Vietnam had as many 
as a hundred thousand “flower soldiers,” 
soldiers who paid commanders to 
continue civilian life as normal� In other 
instances the names of dead soldiers 
were kept on the muster rolls so their 
commanders could collect their salaries� 
There are apparent parallels between 
LAM SON 719 and more recent events� 
It was revealed in November 2014 that 
the Iraqi Army had fifty thousand “ghost 
soldiers” who similarly did not exist� 
Likewise, where President Thiệu saw 
ARVN elite units first and foremost 
as a force to crush potential rivals, in 
Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki had similar 
views of using military force to sup-
press Sunni rivals� Thiệu was hesitant 
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about committing forces to LAM SON 
719, and in 2014, when ISIS seized 
Fallujah, Maliki allowed the problem 
to fester. In neither case was suppres-
sion of a hostile insurgency put above 
the objective of maintaining a grip 
on power—much to the frustration 
of Washington. As Henry Kissinger 
would later say of LAM SON 719, it was 
an “operation [that was] conceived in 
ambivalence and assailed by skepticism, 
[and] proceeded in confusion.” Today 
what was then the town of Tchepone lies 
abandoned, though the lessons of 1971 
remain fresh. Sander’s work will likely 
remain the definitive record of the Laos 
campaign until such time as archives 
in Hanoi are made fully available.
JOSEPH HAMMOND
Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, Amer-
ica, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $37.95 
Robert Haddick proposes a revised U.S. 
strategy toward China. He argues— 
agreeing with recent U.S. national 
security strategies—that continued U.S. 
forward presence is the only option that 
supports the American objectives of “an 
open international economic system; 
respect for universal values around the 
world; and a rules-based international 
order that promotes peace, security, and 
opportunity through stronger coopera-
tion.” He articulates a two-front effort 
to ensure China rises within the existing 
international structure: positive rein-
forcement of good behavior combined 
with significant defense reforms to 
allow punishment of bad behavior. 
Haddick discusses the nature of China’s 
military modernization and how it 
bodes ill for the U.S. ability to punish 
Chinese transgressions against inter-
national order. He believes that current 
U.S. force posture is inadequate be-
cause U.S. air and naval capabilities are 
vulnerable to Chinese land-, air-, and 
sea-launched cruise missiles and ballistic 
missiles. And future U.S. capabilities—
the F-35 in particular—have insuf-
ficient range to operate from existing 
bases under the antiaccess umbrella 
created by these weapons. To counter 
the tactical and operational challenges 
these weapons create he advocates the 
Pentagon develop a new long-range 
bomber and long-range cruise mis-
siles able to penetrate Chinese airspace 
and hold critical targets at risk. He also 
promotes autonomous aerial projectiles 
based on a 1990s DARPA model to 
locate and destroy road-mobile mis-
sile launchers. He argues convincingly 
that his acquisition proposals solve the 
likely tactical and operational problems 
of a future war with China, but he does 
not engage with the highly contested 
literature on the strategic effectiveness of 
airpower. Without a theory of strategic 
effectiveness, he fails to make the case 
that these new capabilities would sup-
port his strategy and influence Chinese 
decision making during crisis or war. 
Additional proposals are designed to 
threaten presumed Chinese fears. These 
include encouraging America’s regional 
allies to develop their own antiaccess 
capabilities on the First Island Chain, 
improving U.S. Navy blockading capac-
ity, developing irregular warfare capacity 
among China’s minority populations, 
and developing antisatellite weaponry. 
However, if China continues its policy of 
“salami slicing,” these weapons and plans 
will never see battle. By incrementally 
challenging the existing regional order, 
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China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving 
its objectives without risking war. Beijing 
understands there is a threshold for U.S. 
military response and will continue to 
operate below it. An American president 
would be loath to fire the first shots over 
the Chinese occupation of an uninhab-
ited island. Haddick therefore argues the 
United States should develop policies to 
encourage China to follow the existing 
international rules in letter and spirit. 
Unfortunately, he does not detail these 
policies, leaving his strategy wanting. 
Haddick states that strategy is about 
managing risk. While much of what 
Haddick proposes seems commonsensi-
cal, it is unfinished, and this poses risks. 
Focusing only on punitive measures 
against possible Chinese actions runs 
the risk of ignoring the ways China 
has played by the rules while further-
ing a mind-set where every develop-
ment in the PLA’s modernization is 
perceived as a threat to U.S. regional 
interests—regardless of Chinese inten-
tions. This book should be read as part 
of an ongoing and equally unfinished 
debate on how to handle a rising China. 
IAN T. SUNDSTROM
Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute 
on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics 
is a collection of thirteen essays as-
sembled by Captain Wayne Hughes, 
USN (Ret.)—author of several books, 
most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal 
Combat and Military Modeling for Deci-
sion Making. Captain Hughes is also 
an accomplished naval officer, having 
served as commanding officer of USS 
Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS 
Morton (DD 948). Notable authors ap-
pearing in On Tactics include Admiral 
Woodward, RN, who commanded 
British forces in the Falklands War, and 
Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the 
Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part 
of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel 
Books series, which is a collection of 
books containing some of the Naval 
Institute’s most well-regarded articles 
from Proceedings—and other sources—
on such topics as naval leadership, 
command, strategy, and cooperation. 
On Tactics is well worth the reader’s 
time, and appropriate for both junior 
and senior officers. It benefits greatly 
from Hughes’s insightful commentary 
and tactful editing, which boils the com-
bined length of the selected essays down 
to a manageable 190 pages. Although the 
topic of tactics is broadly applicable to 
all naval communities, surface warfare 
officers will probably have the easiest 
time relating to the selected essays.
Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a 
favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,” 
written by Hughes himself. “Missile 
Chess” describes a game created by 
Hughes in which players sit down to play 
a traditional game of chess but with a ma-
jor twist: the players have a fixed number 
of “missiles” that they must distribute 
among their pieces as they see fit. The 
pieces still move according to the rules of 
regular chess, but each time they capture 
an opposing piece they expend one “mis-
sile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is 
depleted a piece can still move but can no 
longer capture. After he walks us through 
several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear 
that despite its simplicity, missile chess 
nicely elucidates some of the most vex-
ing operational challenges with which a 
modern naval commander must contend.
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My only criticism of On Tactics is 
that some of the selected essays veer 
into areas that could more aptly be 
described as “strategy” or “enterprise 
management�” For example, “Toward 
a New Identity” chronicles Admiral 
Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet 
together long enough to test the tactical 
doctrines flowing out of the recently 
founded Naval War College� Although 
this is a fine essay, it does not provide 
the reader with any particular insight 
into tactics� Rather, it provides insight 
into why new tactics can be difficult to 
develop� Similarly, “Creating ASW Kill-
ing Zones,” although an excellent piece 
on Cold War antisubmarine warfare 
operations and strategy, does not pro-
vide much in the way of tactical insights 
on how to defeat the submarine threat� 
The great advantage of this book, and 
indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is 
that it makes many excellent articles and 
essays readily available to the reading 
public—essays that might otherwise 
have fallen by the wayside� Overall, 
this volume is an excellent addition to 
any personal library� The size of the 
book and length of the articles make 
it an excellent work for professional 
development, wardroom discussion, 
and thought-provoking conversation�
CHARLES H� LEWIS
Wachman, Alan M� Why Taiwan? Geostrategic 
Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stan-
ford, Calif�: Stanford Univ� Press, 2007� 272pp� 
$25�95 
Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan 
Wachman was a giant in the China, East 
Asian studies, and international rela-
tions field who remains sorely missed 
following his untimely death in 2012� 
In what is widely considered one of his 
major scholarly contributions, through 
this pithy, well-researched book—rightly 
considered a classic—Wachman engages 
in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis 
to offer provocative coverage of histori-
cal episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s 
status fundamentally� Some events raise 
penetrating questions about what might 
have resulted had they ended differently; 
other factors inspire critical questions 
about East Asia’s future� Wachman de-
velops a theme of the strategic salience 
of “imagined geography” as the best 
explanation for the significant variation 
over time in the association of Taiwan 
as part of Chinese sovereign territory 
in the minds of the leaders, and even 
the populace, of mainland China� He 
does so through close examination of 
key Chinese documents and terminol-
ogy as well as careful consideration of 
their relative authority and reliability� 
Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen, 
Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Com-
munist Party, Mao Zedong, and even 
possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially 
consider Taiwan to be part of China in 
the sense that it is understood officially 
today� This approach raises compelling 
questions about state formation and 
national identity that are critical to the 
understanding of international relations� 
Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined 
geography” is a global phenomenon and 
hardly peculiar to China� It is important 
to remember that Taiwan was formally 
incorporated into Qing administration 
in 1683, nearly a century before the 
founding of the United States� One may 
contrast such historical events as the 
American acquisition and incorpora-
tion of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude 
that the factors Wachman considers do 
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not negate mainland China’s sovereignty 
claim to Taiwan. Rather, it is primar-
ily concerned for the maintenance of 
Taiwan’s democracy and the freedoms 
of its citizens that continue to inspire 
Washington’s involvement long after 
the Carter administration abrogated 
the United States–Republic of China 
Mutual Security Treaty in 1980.
While Wachman clearly documents 
Taiwan’s strategic salience (real and 
perceived), other factors may be impor-
tant as well. An alternative explanation 
might consider the challenge of Taiwan 
as a separate polity (e.g., democratic 
system). The vast majority of the other 
“lost territories” to which Wachman 
compares Taiwan have never been 
separate polities; the few that have been 
have not persisted for significant periods 
of time. Hence, political salience may 
be an appropriate variable. In fact, the 
challenge of Taiwan as a separate polity 
has emerged periodically throughout 
history (e.g., through Dutch occupation, 
Qing dynasty separatism under Ming 
loyalist Zheng Chenggong, Japanese 
imperialism, Nationalist rule, and 
today’s multiparty democracy). China’s 
imperial rulers initially viewed Taiwan 
as a remote, politically unorganized 
hinterland. Subsequently, however, 
as alternative political systems were 
imposed or developed on it with identi-
ties and objectives potentially at odds 
with those of Beijing, it periodically 
assumed heightened importance. This 
has geographic underpinnings in the 
sense that physical location rendered 
Taiwan susceptible to both influence and 
conquest by foreign maritime powers 
and later to technological acquisition, 
trade, and the attainment of per capita 
gross domestic product at levels that 
the vast majority of political scientists 
agree are conducive to the develop-
ment of a democratic political system. 
But the Taiwan question has been, and 
remains to this day, a fundamentally 
political one. While Taiwan’s geography 
has not changed, its political identity has 
varied tremendously. Since the end of 
the Cold War, U.S. support for Taiwan 
has arguably hinged on its rapidly lib-
eralized political system, not its geo-
strategic significance. Taiwan is funda-
mentally useful in a geostrategic sense 
primarily for the basing of capabilities 
to facilitate its own defense. While some 
U.S. policy makers no doubt see geo-
strategic benefits to the island’s present 
status even today, it is difficult to imag-
ine Washington being willing to risk the 
expenditure of increasing amounts of 
blood and treasure if and when Taiwan’s 
democratic system is no longer at stake. 
Should the day come when a major-
ity of Taiwan’s populace favors formal 
unification with the mainland—and 
this popular will is expressed through 
a transparent democratic process with 
no external coercion—it is inconceiv-
able that Washington could actively 
oppose such a transition on geostrategic 
grounds. There is, however, the disturb-
ing possibility that even if Washington’s 
policy toward Taipei is not fundamental-
ly geostrategic in motivation, policy ad-
vocated by elements of China’s govern-
ment (particularly the military) may be.
Wachman does acknowledge related 
complexities and the difficulty of finding 
conclusive evidence for his geostrategic 
explanation. However one may view 
these sensitive issues—which remain 
hotly contested—Wachman has made a 
valuable contribution on a critical issue 
whose complex history and enduring 
significance are forgotten at the peril of 
all in the Asia-Pacific. The complexities 
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Wachman introduces provide important 
considerations for the continuing debate 
over Taiwan’s future. Those fortunate 
enough to have known Wachman 
personally know what a fine friend and 
colleague he was; all can benefit from 
his intellectual legacy, of which this 
book is an important, enduring part.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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